Subject: Re: AVG war diary
From: jl@news-server (John Lundstrom)
Date: Sep 12 1995
Newsgroups: rec.aviation.military

Erik Shilling (erikavg@ix.netcom.com) wrote:

: John Lundstruom; Would you trade a Zero for a P-40?
: Research is never better than the source from which it is obtained.
: I guess that's why the court system does not allow hearsay
: evidence!!!

Mr. Shilling,
	My information came from four days of interviews with retired
Admiral John S. Thach (in October 1974), his own original papers, plus
documents I have since located in the National Archives, Record Group
313 (USN FLAG FILES, records of Commander, Aircraft, Battle Force,
Pacific Fleet), as well as interviews with many other USN pilots,
including all the living survivors who first flew the weave at
Midway.
 I don't consider this "hearsay," but perhaps others
might.
	Would I trade a Zero for a P-40? Depends who would be flying
them.


: wing tips, on rear of fuselage, and dull grey color.  Two flights
: of four attacked from beam out of sun after overtaking from rear,
: one flight plus two "Weavers" remained above as reserve.  Flight
: split into pairs and singly after two or three runs continuing
: coordinating attack from all directions, above and below except
: dead ahead. 
:      AFTER FIFTEEN MINUTES OF COMBAT RESERVE FLIGHT AND WEAVERS
: CAME INTO THE ATTACK, pilots with jammed guns fell to rear or

	It is obvious from this report that the weavers referred to
derived from the RAF system in vogue 1940-42 of using 1 or 2 fighters
weaving to the rear of flights as look outs trying to protect the
flights from being bounced. They would fly S-turns back and forth
above and behind the flights, keeping a watch to the rear.

The Brits during the Battle of Britain discovered that these weavers
often did not come back, having been picked off by German fighters
without the main flight ever knowing. It was not a mutual defense
tactics, but an attempt at warning the main body. Anybody who has
read about the Battle of Britain in detail will recognize the practice.

	To the USN the tactic became known as "Charlie," after
"Ass-end Charlie." They learned of it from the RAF, according to OPNAV
Confidential Ltr. A16-3(5) of 5 Mar. 1941 and ComAirBatFor 
Endorsement of 27 Mar. 1941). The Navy's carrier squadrons tested
the use of weavers and found the practice wanting, a waste of fuel. Thach 
tested it in May 1941 and thought the idea of a rear element weaving
was not useful in itself, but it got him thinking about lookout
doctrine.

	The Thach weave as invented and developed by Thach himself in
late 1941 was totally different than the RAF and the AVG practice of
using fighters weaving behind flights. In using the Thach weave, the
fighters deployed abreast in two elements, each watching over the tail
of the other. When the Japanese attacked one element, the other, AT
THE PROPER MOMENT WHEN THE ATTACKERS WERE COMMITTED TO THE ATTACK,
initiated the weave by turning toward the element coming under
attack. The fighters under attack only weaved and offered mutual
support while they were under attack. Thach called it his "beam
defense position." It was perhaps the most sophisticated defensive
tactic of the war, particularly for pilots who flew fighters that
were outperformed by their attackers and, most importantly, pilots
who could make deflection shots, because many of the counters were
full deflection shots.

	Mr. Shilling, I will send you copies of my materials on
the Thach Weave, and ask whether you remember ever doing anything
like that while in the AVG. I think it would be useful to
contact AVG veterans who later returned to the USN/USMC to see
when they, in fact, learned the Thach Weave.

	I must say that if the kind of research I have done on the
Thach Weave is to be dismissed as hearsay, then perhaps historians
should just forget about their craft and do some gardening.
                       John Lundstrom

From: erikavg@ix.netcom.com(Erik Shilling)
Newsgroups: rec.aviation.military
Subject: Re: continuing saga of the Thach Weave
Date: 7 Aug 1997 20:37:15 GMT

In <Pine.OSF.3.96L.970806062215.4999A-100000@christa.unh.edu> Dan Ford
<df@christa.unh.edu> writes:
Date: Wed, 6 Aug 1997 06:30:36 -0400

<df@christa.unh.edu> Danford wrote:

>I can't believe that this conversation is still going on. Wasn't
>it a year or so ago that we went through this same mistake?
snip

Really Dan, why is it so difficult for you to understand that there
are many reading this newgroup today, who may not have even had a
computer one year ago.

>AVG Flying Tiger weavers = two or three P-40s flying above and
>behind a larger number of P-40s to protect them from being
>bounced.
snip

You and a few others, haven't the vaguest idea how the tigers flew
the weave. Secondly we never had a large numbers of AVG flying
against the Japanese.

>Thach weave: two Wildcats turning in opposite directions upon the
>approach of a Zero. When the Zero commits to attacking one
>Wildcat, the other turns into him for a deflection shot. Simple,
>brilliant,effective.
snip

What is so brilliant about defending one of your own who was about
to be clobbered by a Japanese fighter??? What the hell do you think
our weavers were doing just watching as our leader or wingman was
being jumped??

>> Regarding the turning combat, even Chennault had to write a memo
>>to men in the 23rd warning them to stop attempting to turn with
>>the Japanese fighters. The memo was written in August of 1942.
>
>Well, and who commanded the China Air Task force, of which the
>23rd FG was the most important element? That Chennault, who knew
>about and approved of the zoom & boom tactic (which he'd seen
>Russian fighters use against Japanese fighters in China in
>1938--and so reported to the AGO), wasn't able to keep his pilots
>from dogfighting, what hope was there for the poor slobs in the
>P-38 outfit?
snip

What you don't understand is that they had been taught the turning
combat back in the States, and when in a bind, reverted to dog-
fighting.

the Russians did not use the Zoom & Boom method of attack. In 1938
the speed difference between the Russian and the Japanese fighter
plane was to close. Therefore they could not use Zoom & Boom.
They were flying Russian I-15, and only a few I-16s.


Chennault describe in great detail of a Russian combat against a
Japanese. Even though the Russian had some speed on the Japanese,
and could not turn with him he still chose to dog fighting.

It is true Chennault commanded the 23rd, however he had absolutely,
nothing to do with the training these pilots receive back in the
US. But he sure as hell prevented them from committing the mistakes
that were being made by those flying the P-38 in the Pacific in
1943.

Dan doesn't know what he's writing about. Also when the Zero came
into the picture, it was the Japanese that used the ZOOM & BOOM
against the Chinese. They were flying the Russian made I-15's and
I-16s. The I-15 was about 80 mph slower and could out-turn the
Zero. The I-16 was about 30 mph slower and it too could out-turn
the Zero.

Your knowledge of fighter tactic is lacking, because the Russians
back in 1938 could not have used the Zoom and Boom tactic. It can
only be used if the speed differential between airplanes is great
enough.

I disagree with Ford about the source of Chennault's tactics.
However regardless of where he obtained his information, at least
he passed it on to his pilots. Don't forget, it was Chennault's
pilots who had the lowest losses fighting the Japanese, than any
other commander in the entire pacific theater. Especially when one
considers the type of fighter the AVG flew.

>The Hayabusa could turn inside a Zero, thanks to its butterfly
>combat flaps, but it had a significant weakness in the wings.

Butterfly flap, what the hell is this? Another term invented by
Ford no doubt. Probably similar to his inventing of the Propeller
cone instead of calling it a spinner?

>Parker Dupouy collided with a Hayabusa over the Gulf of Martaban;
>the Hayabusa lost its wing, Dupouy his wingtip but not the use of
>his aileron.
snip

Parker Dupouy lost over three feet from his left wing, including
the entire left aileron. I don't think the left aileron was
useable.

More Zeros lost their wing due to flutter than the Hayabusa.
As a matter of fact I don't believe any Hayabusa's lost their
wings.

Ford is confusing the Zero with the Hayabusa. It was the Zero that
had aileron flutter and lost wings. It was also the Zero that had
servo controls installed on the ailerons. An after thought to
reduce aileron control loads at high speed. When this was installed
it caused aileron flutter.

THERE IS NOT just ONE way to fly a defensive weave, but many
variation. Just as there are many types of formation flying, there
are many types of weaves. Neither variations are set in concrete.

Unfortunately there are those non-pilot individuals who seem to
think that there was one way, and one way only to fly the "weave."
For their information, this is not true.

Weave by definition, is a type of formation and is purely a
descriptive term. Even the dumbest knows there are dozens of
different types of formations. However the same applies to the
Weave which also has many variations.

One types of weave was used by the AVG during the "Battle of the
Salween River."  Some nitpickers may take exception to my
description as being a battle, yet a small group of AVG
fighter/bombers stopped the Japanese advance at the Salween,
without the help of any ground forces. The Chinese army was in full
retreat, and the whole of Southwest China was open for the taking.
Stillwell who commanded this army, was sloshing through the Burmese
Jungle on his way to India.

Six P-40 "E" bombed and strafed the Japanese on the road leading
down to the Salween river gorge. While six P-40 B's, ( Yes Model B)
including two of this six flying top cover in support of those
doing the strafing were weavers. When the "Es" finished their
strafing, top cover was called down to strafe, allowing the "E's"
to fly top cover.

Another type of weaving was used when escorting much slower bombers
such as the British Blenhiems, or the Russian SB2's. Here the
bombers were so slow the whole escorting fighter formation had to
weave. In this case setting aside two fighter for weaving was
unnecessary. Being escorted by 4 P-40's each element of two started
out on opposite sides of the bombers and wove toward each other.

A third type of weave was used when patrolling, or waiting to
intercept an incoming enemy formation. (No we did not always know
if it were a false alarm or the real thing. Also the information
given us did not always tell us where they were or from what
direction they would be coming from.)

A fourth type of weave. Two weavers flying about 1000 feet apart
wove back and forth, flying toward each other always able to
defending each other's six, whether going toward, or away from each
other as they scissored.

Hell there are dozens of ways a weave can, and was flown.

Anyone who says the Thach weave was different from that flown by
the AVG, does not understand the flexibility of fighter combat
tactics.

Just saying flying formation does not describe how a formation is
flown, any more than saying there were weavers.

Getting back to the formation. In the case of a six ship formation.
there can be two elements of three, three elements of two. A
company front of six, A company front of two elements of three and
a company front of three elements of two. An echelon of two
elements of six to the right -up - and down etc.

All I said in the past was that Thach DID NOT invent the weave, but
NEITHER did the Flying Tigers. Not being there, and only reading
about the weave, I fail to understand what motivates some to
arguing about how the weave was flown. Regardless of how the weave
was flown, the principle of the weave is the same, since it was
flow for mutual protection of the entire formation.

If I am assigned as one of the weavers, I know how to perform it.
However in attempting to describe the weave, it may give each one
who reads my description a different mind's eye picture, especially
for one who is not a fighter pilot, and can think in the three
dimensional world.

Food for thought:

How about describing a cork screw.

Also has any one reading RAM, ever wondered why only those who have
never been in combat, nor have flown fighter planes during WW II,
disagree with what I post.

I also find it strange how they consider themselves experts on
subject they have only read about. I doubt that any one who has
never flown an airplane could describe how to fly a simple pylon 8,
or even knows the difference between it and 8's on pylons, yet
tries to tell me how the AVG flew the weave. How about describing,
how, when, and why a tactical approach was done?

I find it amusing that a person who has never flown in combat,
never flown formation, never flown a fighter plane, never flown a
defensive weave. has the audacity to argue with one who had flown
fighter for more than 5 years and has flown every conceivable type
of formation including the "WEAVE," tell me I don't know what I'm
saying.

There have been no WW II fighter pilots who have shown any basic
disagreement with my posts, so where the hell are you who thinks
himself to be an expert on the subject, coming from?

Erik Shilling

I wonder if we should call it the "Ford Weave"

From: cdb100620@aol.com (CDB100620)
Newsgroups: rec.aviation.military
Subject: Re: continuing saga of the Thach Weave
Date: 8 Aug 1997 23:36:03 GMT

>>Thach weave: two Wildcats turning in opposite directions upon the
>>approach of a Zero. When the Zero commits to attacking one
>>Wildcat, the other turns into him for a deflection shot. Simple,
>>brilliant,effective.
>snip
>
>What is so brilliant about defending one of your own who was about
>to be clobbered by a Japanese fighter?

The Thach Weave may have been a life-saver for the F4F drivers, but, after
reading the description of it in Lundstrom's book, I can't think how it
would be all that useful to someone flying a P-40 facing Zeros.  The only
circumstance might be if caught down on the deck in a damaged machine that
couldn't make full speed.
The Thach Weave appears purely defensive, better than a Lufberry Circle in
that you can make distance over your track, but it doesn't get you out of
the situation or enable you to position your airplane to turn the tables.
I guess an F4F wasn't capable of doing that anyway.
A P-40 driver would be better served by performing a Split-S followed by a
zoom climb.  Depending on the tactical situation, the zoom climb could be
transformed into a fast, shallow climb which no Zero could follow.  Cloud
cover would be used to screen actions, of course.  Or the pilot could
simply count on disappearing into the milky haze of much tropical weather
or vanishing against ground clutter while in his dive.
In any case, the object would be to extend away from the Zeros, regain
altitude while maintaining as much speed as possible, then come back
up-sun with an altitude advantage and blood in your eye (figuratively
speaking).

The probability was good that the Zero(s) would have tried to follow you
in the dive, at least for a while (they knew they shouldn't, but once the
hunt is on, it's hard not to act like a hound chasing a fox), so you'd
have a good chance of showing up back on the scene with a good altitude
advantage.  Then you are the aggressor and the Zekes have to act
defensively.  Of course, your plan is to pick out one and hit him before
he realizes you're back and is able to make any defensive moves.  Then you
can either keep on diving and scoot for home, or zoom up and do it all
over again.

If, for whateve reason, you don't wish to engage, the P-40 would take you
well clear of the action with great dispatch.  I don't think any P-40
driver would want to monkey around Thach Weaving when he could point the
nose down and vanish.

It seems the Thach Weave would not have been helpful for P-40s escorting
other aircraft, either.  Being defensive, and slowing you down, it would
mean a handful of Zeros could keep you occupied while their buddies went
after your charges unmolested.  On the other hand, a P-40 surprised by
Zeros could Split-S away, zoom back up going "full goose bozo" to disrupt
Zero firing passes at the bombers or transports in the charge of the
P-40s.

While weaving was done in various ways, as Erik Shilling has described, in
order to avoid being surprised by the approach of an enemy, many pilots
did not like the idea of weaving.  The reason was that weaving aircraft
can be seen from much farther away than planes flying steadily along.  The
sun flashing off wing and canopy as the planes maneuver can be seen a long
way off.  Many pilots felt that the risk of detection caused by weaving
was worse than the value of increased view weaving allowed.  They
preferred the security of multiple rotating necks to the risk of letting
the enemy know where you were long in advance of your approach, so that
they could maneuver for a bounce out of the sun.  A defensive weave would
not have appealed to army pilots in fast diving ships with good zoom climb
ability such as the P-40.  Certainly a Thach Weave in a P-38 would have
been as useless as a side saddle on a hog.

I can't imagine the Thach Weave would have been of much use to someone
steering an F4U, or even an F6F, either.

From: erikavg@ix.netcom.com(Erik Shilling)
Newsgroups: rec.aviation.military
Subject: Re: continuing saga of the Thach Weave
Date: 9 Aug 1997 22:30:41 GMT

In <19970808233600.TAA03067@ladder01.news.aol.com> cdb100620@aol.com
(CDB100620) writes:
>From: cdb100620@aol.com (CDB100620)
Subject: Re: continuing saga of the Thach Weave

Ford wrote:
>>Thach weave: two Wildcats turning in opposite directions upon the
>>approach of a Zero. When the Zero commits to attacking one
>>Wildcat, the other turns into him for a deflection shot. Simple,
>>brilliant,effective.
>snip

>shilling wrote:
>What is so brilliant about defending one of your own who was about
>to be clobbered by a Japanese fighter?

cdb100620@aol.com wrote:

What this person has written is the most intelligent information
anyone has posted on the net concerning the "weave."

A dollar to a doughnut that the writer was a fighter pilot, also
that he fought in the Pacific, and most likely against the Zero. So
far he is the ONLY one who knows what the hell he is saying, in
describing the uselessness of the "Illustrious" weave that Thach
supposedly invented.

I want to make it perfectly clear, I was NOT defending the value of
the weave, but only that Thach DID not invent it.

I don't understand why many non pilot experts think the weave was
the best thing that came along since sliced bread. They don't
realize that ONCE jumped, and the fight begins, the weaver are no
longer of any value, since the rest of the formation is probably
out of sight. At best its value was only to gave warning of the
impending attack. Making head on passes against the 20 mm cannons
was not conducive to long life..

Therefore NO one in his right mind would want to make head on runs
against the zero's 20 mm cannons.

Unlike the type of fighters we encountered, the Flying Tigers
welcomed the head on pass against the I-97 and Hayabusa Ki 43. The
guns on the P-40's both outgunned and outranged the Japanese.

Although what followed in the post was correct in every detail,
much snipped for brevity.

>The Thach Weave appears purely defensive, better than a Lufberry
>Circle in that you can make distance over your track, but it
>doesn't get you out of the situation or enable you to position
>your airplane to turn the tables.
snip

Thanks to a fighter pilot who has brought some sense into the
argument.
Although important to the discussion I've snipped some more.

>Depending on the tactical situation, the zoom climb could be
>transformed into a fast, shallow climb which no Zero could follow.
snip

I have said this many time, but our experts hate to listen. The P-
40 could out-climb the Zero, and out-distance it at the same time.
With cowl flaps closed, and indicating 240 mph, its rate of climb
was in excess of 2,000 f/p/m.
(Or should I say butterfly flaps, since some one alluded to the
fact that it was the Japanese who invented the term butterfly
flaps, not Dan Ford. I was not aware that butterfly was an english
word, or is it that butterfly is a Japanese word.

snipped
>In any case, the object would be to extend away from the Zeros,
>regain altitude while maintaining as much speed as possible, then
>come back up-sun with an altitude advantage and blood in your eye
>(figuratively speaking).
snip

Historians please take note. This guy knows what he is talking
about.

>so you'd have a good chance of showing up back on the scene with
>a good altitude advantage.  Then you are the aggressor and the
>Zekes have to act defensively.  Of course, your plan is to pick
>out one and hit him before he realizes you're back and is able to
>make any defensive moves.  Then you can either keep on diving and
>scoot for home, or zoom up and do it all over again.

>I don't think any P-40 driver would want to monkey around Thach
>Weaving when he could point the nose down and vanish.
Amen to this.


Erik Shilling

From: jl@www.mpm.edu (John Lundstrom)
Newsgroups: rec.aviation.military
Subject: Re: continuing saga of the Thach Weave
Date: 11 Aug 1997 13:19:19 GMT

Erik Shilling (erikavg@ix.netcom.com) wrote:

: What this person has written is the most intelligent information
: anyone has posted on the net concerning the "weave."

: A dollar to a doughnut that the writer was a fighter pilot, also
: that he fought in the Pacific, and most likely against the Zero. So
: far he is the ONLY one who knows what the hell he is saying, in
: describing the uselessness of the "Illustrious" weave that Thach
: supposedly invented.

Erik,
	I honestly believe that you do not understand the fundamentals
of the Thach Weave or the circumstances under which he INVENTED it
or you would not say this. What Thach devised IS different than the
RAF tactic of Weavers used in the Battle of Britain ("Ass-end
Charlies") who constantly weaved back and forth to provide lookout
to the rear of the main body and often got picked off in the process.
I would send you copies from USN tactical manuals
and Thach's own notes, if you are willing. I think you would see
this tactic was not like what the AVG was practicing. If you do
not wish to see such materials, I personally would have to judge
you as obtuse and dogmatic as you claim that historians, such as
myself, act.

: I want to make it perfectly clear, I was NOT defending the value of
: the weave, but only that Thach DID not invent it.

: I don't understand why many non pilot experts think the weave was
: the best thing that came along since sliced bread. They don't
: realize that ONCE jumped, and the fight begins, the weaver are no
: longer of any value, since the rest of the formation is probably
: out of sight. At best its value was only to gave warning of the
: impending attack. Making head on passes against the 20 mm cannons
: was not conducive to long life..

	The Thach Weave kept one alive AND going in the direction
that the bombers being escorted were going.

: Therefore NO one in his right mind would want to make head on runs
: against the zero's 20 mm cannons.

: Unlike the type of fighters we encountered, the Flying Tigers
: welcomed the head on pass against the I-97 and Hayabusa Ki 43. The
: guns on the P-40's both outgunned and outranged the Japanese.

The USN/USMC pilots did exactly the same thing with the Zeros in
1942, because that often was the only way they could deal with
fighters that out-maneuvered and out-climbed them so easily.
The last thing they could or would do was dive away. Joe Bauer
and Joe Foss at Guadalcanal used what they called "pincushion"
tactics, because they knew the Zero was fragile, a "fertile
target," in Joe Bauer's words. These Marines did not know the
Thach Weave, it had not yet been explained to them (Thach was
just starting to do so in the training command). When attacked
by Zeros, the key was to scissor and turn into the incoming
Zeros for a head-on pass. If a Zero jumped his tail, the F4F
pilot was to "cut the throttle, slip, skid, and otherwise
kick it around until the Zero overruns, then pour on the coal
and let 'em have it." Under no circumstances was the F4F to
turn tail and run. The Marines had confidence in their armor,
protected fuel tanks, and rugged Pratt & Whitney radial
engine.
	The Marines discovered that in near head-on passes,
the Zeros often underled and the 20-mms, with their limited
ammunition supply, short range and low muzzle velocity,
was often much less effective that perhaps might have been.

	It is easy to be condescending about the F4F Wildcat,
but this airplane took off and landed from carriers. It
accomplished a mission that the vaunted P-40 could not. It
also helped turn the tide of the war in the Pacific.

	Sorry to be so preachy about this, but I think a lot
has been forgotten in this discussion.
                              John Lundstrom

From: jl@www.mpm.edu (John Lundstrom)
Newsgroups: rec.aviation.military
Subject: Re: continuing saga of the Thach Weave
Date: 11 Aug 1997 12:55:47 GMT

CDB100620 (cdb100620@aol.com) wrote:

: The Thach Weave may have been a life-saver for the F4F drivers, but, after
: reading the description of it in Lundstrom's book, I can't think how it
: would be all that useful to someone flying a P-40 facing Zeros.  The only
: circumstance might be if caught down on the deck in a damaged machine that
: couldn't make full speed.
: The Thach Weave appears purely defensive, better than a Lufberry Circle in
: that you can make distance over your track, but it doesn't get you out of
: the situation or enable you to position your airplane to turn the tables.
: I guess an F4F wasn't capable of doing that anyway.

Several key things about the Thach Weave must be noted, Incidentally Thach
called it the "Beam Defense Position." Only later did Jimmy Flatley call
it the Thach Weave. I think the original name describes it well because
the weaving was only one part of it.
	First of all it was designed as an escort tactic. Navy fighters
had to protect slow, single-engine torpedo bombers that often flew below
6,000 feet to the target. We're talking TBD Devastators that cruised
at 105-110 knots, whereas the minumum speed an F4F Wildcat could begin
to maneuver crisply was about 140 knots. Hence the escort fighters
often weaved in wide S-turns back and forth just to maintain station.
That was not the Thach Weave.
	The keys to the Thach Weave were; 1) the deployment with the two
sections (or divisions) out ABEAM of each other, widely separated. They
did not initiate the Thach Weave properly until attacked, even more
so until the enemy had committed himself to attacking one of the sections.
2) lookout doctrine whereby each section kept any eye on the other's
tail as well as out ahead. 3) waiting until the proper moment, when
the enemy was committed, before turning toward the section under attack
and initiating the weave. If the enemy followed the attacked section
around, then the other section would get a head-on shot. If the enemy
just kept on going, the other section would have a full deflection shot
as it pulled out ahead--which leads to the next key--the USN/USMC's
ability to shoot full deflection, which offered many more opportunities
to counterattack. Indeed a good share of the victories scored in 1942
by F4F pilots over Zeros were done by evading an attack and firing
as the Zero overran and ended up in front or as it was climbing away.


: A P-40 driver would be better served by performing a Split-S followed by a
: zoom climb.  Depending on the tactical situation, the zoom climb could be
: transformed into a fast, shallow climb which no Zero could follow.  Cloud
: cover would be used to screen actions, of course.  Or the pilot could
: simply count on disappearing into the milky haze of much tropical weather
: or vanishing against ground clutter while in his dive.
: In any case, the object would be to extend away from the Zeros, regain
: altitude while maintaining as much speed as possible, then come back
: up-sun with an altitude advantage and blood in your eye (figuratively
: speaking).

This certainly was best if you had the altitude and could afford to do it,
although you would certainly lose any tactical cohesion, which the Thach
Weave could help maintain.


: The probability was good that the Zero(s) would have tried to follow you
: in the dive, at least for a while (they knew they shouldn't, but once the
: hunt is on, it's hard not to act like a hound chasing a fox), so you'd
: have a good chance of showing up back on the scene with a good altitude
: advantage.  Then you are the aggressor and the Zekes have to act
: defensively.  Of course, your plan is to pick out one and hit him before
: he realizes you're back and is able to make any defensive moves.  Then you
: can either keep on diving and scoot for home, or zoom up and do it all
: over again.

	With in IJN in 1942 (unlike the IJAAF which the AVG fought),
tactical cohesion was stressed, and one very rarely surprised a Zero
formation or got one where it could easily be picked off.


: If, for whateve reason, you don't wish to engage, the P-40 would take you
: well clear of the action with great dispatch.  I don't think any P-40
: driver would want to monkey around Thach Weaving when he could point the
: nose down and vanish.

: It seems the Thach Weave would not have been helpful for P-40s escorting
: other aircraft, either.  Being defensive, and slowing you down, it would
: mean a handful of Zeros could keep you occupied while their buddies went
: after your charges unmolested.  On the other hand, a P-40 surprised by
: Zeros could Split-S away, zoom back up going "full goose bozo" to disrupt
: Zero firing passes at the bombers or transports in the charge of the
: P-40s.

	Again, tactical roles were different for USN CARRIER fighters,
who often had a lot less freedom in accomplishing their mission.

: While weaving was done in various ways, as Erik Shilling has described, in
: order to avoid being surprised by the approach of an enemy, many pilots
: did not like the idea of weaving.  The reason was that weaving aircraft
: can be seen from much farther away than planes flying steadily along.

	Again, the Thach Weave only took place under direct attack. There
was no constant weaving, execept the simple S-turns used to stay with
slower bombers.

: I can't imagine the Thach Weave would have been of much use to someone
: steering an F4U, or even an F6F, either.

	Interesting, since the Navy taught it into the 1950s and I've
talked to numerous F6F and F4U pilots who used ity in 1943-45 and
liked it. Again, it depended on the mission, which for them often
were escorts or fighter strikes where the initial beam deployment
was crucial.

                                 John Lundstrom

From: jl@www.mpm.edu (John Lundstrom)
Newsgroups: rec.aviation.military
Subject: Re: continuing saga of the Thach Weave
Date: 12 Aug 1997 15:43:03 GMT

Ernest D. Foote (efoote@worldnet.att.net) wrote:
: John Lundstrom wrote:
: >
: <snip>
: >         Interesting, since the Navy taught it into the 1950s and I've
: > talked to numerous F6F and F4U pilots who used ity in 1943-45 and
: > liked it. Again, it depended on the mission, which for them often
: > were escorts or fighter strikes where the initial beam deployment
: > was crucial.
: >
: >                                  John Lundstrom

: Make that well into the 1960's by A-1 RAGs  (SPADS).  I believe that a
: well trained division of A-1s using the thatch weave was very dangerous
: to any attacking Jet aircraft.  In fact did not a few Migs find this out
: in SEA?

: God knows when I first started flying phantoms my skipper could never
: resist jumping on the SPADS at marshal point.  He inevitably slowed down
: when one section turned away from the attack and ended up with two on
: his nose and two on his tail as he went into burner and tried to escape,
: having lost all his advantage.

: I never did understand why the Phantoms didn't use it, especially when
: escorting slower aircraft. I did train my division to fly it.  The party
: line was the turn radius of the F-4 was too big, but IMO the real
: problem was that  it was "not invented here (NIH)".

: My 2 cents

: Ernie

Back in 1974 I had the great privilege of staying four days with Admiral
Thach. He showed me a letter he had received from an F-4 squadron CO in
Vietnam. It seems this fellow had developed a new fighter tactic which
he happily took credit for until an old timer pointed out it was the
Thach Weave. He wrote Thach to apologize for "re-inventing the wheel."
I've got a copy of the letter in my files. If anyone's interested,
I can dig it out.

                                    John Lundstrom