From: thunder@rmii.com (Ed Rasimus)
Newsgroups: rec.aviation.military
Subject: Re: F-16 'D' better for SEAD role ???
Date: Fri, 10 Jul 1998 14:14:32 GMT

Dweezil Dwarftosser <wcsys@usa.net> wrote:

>John S. Shinal wrote:
>>         Perhaps this is mostly a software/integration issue ?
>
>Definitely not - though that is of course a consideration.
>Omitting the F-100 and F-4C Wild Weasels ( which, for different
>reasons were similar to the F-16 in that they were not completely
>"up to the job" ), the F-105G ( of which there were actually many
>congifurations - including one with long underwing fuselage fair-
>ings that housed the equivalent of "ecm pods" internally ) and the
>F-4G were very successful combat-proven bombers with considerable
>air-to-air self-protection capability.  Both had plenty of weapons-
>carriage capability ( dead weight + number of stations ), fuel tanks,
>and both had much-improved threat-detection capabilities installed.

The F-100F (which was Wild Weasel II--the first iteration being the
USN Iron Hand A-4 aircraft), was merely a host for the first USAF RHAW
gear, the APR 25/26. Coupled with Shrike carriage the aircraft was
supposed to detect, pre-empt and "fast-FAC" some bomb-laden wingmen
onto the threat. The problem was the double-breasted Hun moved at
barely 350 kts and the accompanying single-seat 105s kept
inadvertently edging up over 500--something about the throttle hand
pushing forward in response to being shot at.

The F-4C Weasel seemed like a replacement for the 105G, but there was
no room for the APR-38 that the 105 carried and the airframe never got
the right combination of antennae to be reliable. Existing suspension
equipment restricted the ARM carriage to Shrike only, no Standard ARM
and, of course, HARM was just a gleam in the engineer's eye.

AFAIK, all of the 105G conversions had the blister ECM pods. They were
along the fuselage on each side of the bomb-bay doors, and
interestingly they were seldom if ever used. We found out fairly
quickly that use of any ECM pods in the hunter/killer flight would
effectively blank the detection capability of the Weasel. So, we all
kept quiet in the target area. (A result of this was that since we
were not emitting with our pods, we were usually identified by Big Eye
and Red Crown as MiGs.)

It should be noted that a Weasel/SEAD system is more than simply an
ARM platform. The multiplicity of air defense systems and increasingly
sophisticated emission frequencies and patterns require significant
electronics to detect, sort, identify and allocate. You can bring
"vanilla" wingmen along to do the heavy lifting, but the Weasel is
going to be a jam-packed airframe. The F-105G had gotten so "dense"
that the aircraft could not take off with a full fuel load anymore. On
Route Pack VI missions the 105s would launch with the C/L tank empty
and we would hit a PRE-pre-strike tanker to top off. Then do normal
prestrike refueling and head for the target area. By the time we
dropped off to head in we usually had been airborne over two hours and
been on and off the tankers at least five times.


>   You need a full-size aircraft
>for the Wild Weasel role - not a sportscar with a rumble seat.


Couldn't a said it betta myself!


 Ed Rasimus                   *** Peak Computing Magazine
  Fighter Pilot (ret)         ***   (http://peak-computing.com)
                              *** Ziff-Davis Interactive
                              ***   (http://www.zdnet.com)

From: thunder@rmii.com (Ed Rasimus)
Newsgroups: rec.aviation.military
Subject: Re: F-16 'D' better for SEAD role ???
Date: Sun, 12 Jul 1998 18:07:49 GMT

jshinal@mindspring.com (John S. Shinal) wrote:

>	My whole focus in starting this thread was MINIMAL changes to
>the F-16D, since they don't want to fund a danged weasel anyway. Would
>an F-15G or an F-4/2000 be better ? Sure, heck yeah.....but it's just
>not going to happen.
>
>	If extra antennae need fitted, they need not be profusive.
>We're not gonna jam the thing, we're gonna kill them.
>
>	Working hypothesis is the inboard stations, which will have to
>be jettisoned due to G-load restrictions as the Mini-Weasel engages.
>ISTR that the older Weasels dropped tanks in combat also.
>
>>and still retain the capability of carrying a couple of HARMS
>
>	Currently capable of two in the hypothesized loadout. I think
>developing a twin rail launcher for the outboard wing stations should
>be simple and feasible. Barring that, then extended rails and flight
>tests to allow HARMs on stations #2 and #8. Seriously, how damned hard
>can it be to develop a simple launcher or extended rail adapter ?

The flaw in your hypothesis is in the understanding of the basic
mission of SEAD/Weasel. Shooting (H)ARMs is a role that most anyone
can handle. If the station and wiring will conform, bolt the blivet on
and go hunting.

That's not the true function of the Weasel. The "real" job is to
detect, interpret and allocate resources to focus a limited capability
against the deadliest threat. For that you need some broad band
detection capability, some complex interpretive software to
distinguish what is looking, what it guides and how it threatens the
package, then a capability to pin-point that threat and deploy
ordinance against it (ideally the deployed ordinance is
"fire-and-forget" or delivered by someone else.)

That kind of functionality requires a lot of "stuff" installed on the
airframe and a dedicated specialist in interpretation of displays of
intercepts in the electro-magnetic spectrum--i.e. a "bear" not a
fighter pilot grousing about some else driving the airplane (remember
we did that once with PSOs in the F-4.)


>	But all along, I haven't been talking about an EWO per se.
>There are already rated pilots who are the "weapons experts" or SAM
>threat experts in each squadron. These pilots would train others to be
>able to act as HARM shooters. Pilots available on rotating basis, or
>something (they'll love that, I'm sure).
>
>	No dedicated EWOs, no EWO training pipeline, no extra
>personnel costs, just the cost of developing a few launch rails, a few
>antennae and some software integration so it all shows up on the MFDs.

Here is the crux of your mis-understanding of the Weasel role. It's
not (H)ARM shooting, it's detection and interpretation followed by
directing suppression.

And, if you want reliable SEAD, you absolutely DON'T use "pilots
available on a rotating basis". You need specialists, ideally teamed
for considerable training and tactics development. This isn't a wild
west shoot-out.
>
>
>	Mini-weasel. Far from perfect, but let's not paint it all
>black. The idea is plenty of cheap F-16D Mini-Weasels.

When you elect to go "cheap" you usually get what you pay for.

>	The numbers being the very thing that makes my scenario
>attractive. Large numbers of organic Mini-Weasels, without the usual
>bloated development programs. Purely practical, right to the point.

If you mean by the term "organic" that Mini-Weasels would be at
squadron level, you might just as well bolt some CBU on a C-model and
go trolling. Just cruise into the arena and wander around til someone
shoots at you. If you survive the shot you then go and kill the
shooter. Been there, done that. It ain't a pretty picture.
>

 Ed Rasimus                   *** Peak Computing Magazine
  Fighter Pilot (ret)         ***   (http://peak-computing.com)
                              *** Ziff-Davis Interactive
                              ***   (http://www.zdnet.com)

From: thunder@rmii.com (Ed Rasimus)
Newsgroups: rec.aviation.military
Subject: Re: F-16 'D' better for SEAD role ???
Date: Sun, 12 Jul 1998 20:00:20 GMT

"tay" <leyb@shani.com  > wrote:

>I wrote my post very carefully ignoring, of course, the word "better"
>from the header.  I was referring to Ed Rasimus remarks on the
>limitations of the F-16D airframe to perform SEAD role.
>There is couple of things if you care to consider:
>
>A) I specifically wrote "tactical arenas" not "strategic arenas".
>     This is the situation in this side of the ocean.
>
>B) SEAD operation a-la "weasel" style is past war.  Future SEAD
>     operations will be an entirely new game.  That is why I have
>     said:
>     "It would constitute just one element of a very comprehensive
>      and complex operation, comprised of many elements whereby
>      the F-16D would be part of the detection phase and part of the
>      shooting phase"
>
>     and
>
>     "Other airborne assets would assist the F-16D in that mission"
>
>If you like, see June 1982 as a dress rehearsal for one type of SEAD
>operation with the F-16 as a participant.  And these were As and Bs.

Without getting into a mutual admiration society, I'll agree with you
fully. We should be very careful to avoid indiscriminately equating
SEAD with Weasel-ops.

It is possible to "Suppress Enemy Air Defenses" with any tactically
viable platform. That is what you are referring to with the use of A
and B model Vipers. It's even possible to SEAD with RPVs, wide-band
jammers, special operations ground forces and who knows what else.

Nothing will SEAD more effectively (IMO) than a wave of tac-air
lobbing CBU into the target area. Particularly if a lot of it is time
delay and possibly some of it is non-conventional.

And, as you wisely point out, you dance with the ones that brung ya.
If you've got assets of one type and none of another, you use what you
have as effectively and creatively as you can.

Having said all of that, if we now narrow the SEAD definition to the
more specific role of SAM-Suppression then the requirements change. In
the less than ideal world we still go in and root around with whatever
A/G assets are available. But, if we are talking about the most
desireable situations then we build a scenario that is more complex.

And, if we are in the desireable scenario for SAM-Suppression, then
I'll contend you need something more than a HARM shooter, which
probably means a larger airframe and possibly (although not
absolutely) a dedicated EWO. With state-of-the-art technology, you may
even be talking about some sort of super JSTARS/AWACS stand-off
choreographer of resources.

Bottom line is we're in substantial agreement.


 Ed Rasimus                   *** Peak Computing Magazine
  Fighter Pilot (ret)         ***   (http://peak-computing.com)
                              *** Ziff-Davis Interactive
                              ***   (http://www.zdnet.com)

From: thunder@rmii.com (Ed Rasimus)
Newsgroups: rec.aviation.military
Subject: Re: quickie: wild-weasel definition
Date: Fri, 17 Jul 1998 20:23:18 GMT

"Tarver Engineering" <jtarver@tminet.com> wrote:

>>> >"Tarver Engineering" <jtarver@tminet.com> wrote:
>>> >
>>> >>The F-104 was a decoy, the low fast F-4 was a decoy, it is his
>following friends that make the SAM dead.
>>> >
>>> >Clueless as usual. Probably something you saw in a comic book.
>>>
>>> Why thank you Ed, but it was the Lt Col that teaches the weasels to pop
>at eddies that pointed this out to me.  Maybe you could try some of that
>>> viagra?

I politely declined to question what "teaches the weasels to pop at
eddies" means hoping that those who remember some of your other
remarkeable assertions with regard to fratricide among nuclear tasked
crews and Sparrow/Sidewinder carriage by Zulu F-106s would quietly
discount it. However, you continue to post inane drivel, so in the
hope that some folks might learn something, I'll continue.

I've flow SAM suppression with F-100F, F-105F, F-105G and F-4C
Weasels. I've flown A/G in F-105Ds, F-4C/D/E and even the Smurf,
AT-38B. I first learned "pops" at Nellis from the Fighter Weapons
School and in the intervening years I've flown and taught
ground-attack tactics.

I've never seen a Weasel required to "pop" and I've got no idea what
you mean by "eddies". Weasels routinely operate at intermediate
altitudes to increase detection ranges while remaining low enough to
ground mask defensively if needed. They don't need anyone to decoy and
since their primary ordinance is ARMs, they don't need to pop-up to
establish dive angles.
>

>No one cares about your silly games.  However it would be interesting to see
>Ed porvide us with data on the monster Air to Ground capabilities of the
>F-104.

What's your point here? I described my participation in F-105D flights
in support of deployed F-104s of the 435th TFS at Udorn in 1966. I
specifically stated that they had extremely limited A/G capability.
Their loads on the missions were only 2x750 each and their "play-time"
was absurdly limited. Does that "porvide" what you need?


 Ed Rasimus                   *** Peak Computing Magazine
  Fighter Pilot (ret)         ***   (http://peak-computing.com)
                              *** Ziff-Davis Interactive
                              ***   (http://www.zdnet.com)

From: Paul F Austin <paustin@digital.net>
Newsgroups: rec.aviation.military
Subject: Re: How to kill an S-300VM or S-300PMU battery ...
Date: Sun, 19 Jul 1998 20:34:50 GMT

Carlo Kopp wrote:

> Brian Varine wrote:
> >
> > Carlo Kopp wrote:
> >
> > > You are entitled to your opinion, Brian, but I will disagree. Firstly
> > > what look is a SAM system if you park it at the bottom of a valley ?
> > > Secondly, are you genuinely thinking about shooting clouds of chaff into
> > > the air everytime you get painted by an ISAR/GMTI ? Considered that this
> > > might just flag your position out there ? ...
>
> How many countries out there have the kind of EW know-how the West has ?
> Let alone the operational skills to use it right ?
>
> ...
> > Disagree all you want. You can't ignore ECM. How often does J-STARS, and
> > all that other stuff train in full scale ECM??? Rarely if ever.
>
> Not being privy to J-STARS ECCM design design features, Brian, I can't
> comment on whether an EW environment would make a big difference or not.
> But unless you are privy to specific EW design weaknesses in the E-8
> radar, then I would say this is a pointless throwaway argument.
>

The 6 July AvWeek had a key lesson in EW highlighted: that _technique_
is insufficient. Thorough intel and rapid discimination and
incorporation of that intel are every bit as important as having the
very best ECM/ECCM.

The case that stirred the pot is the Iraqi integration of French and Chinese
surveilance RADARs into their SA-2 net. The then-current threat list in
US RWRs didn't include the French and Chinese RADARs _as part of an SA-2
complex_ and
so when Allied aircraft were painted by the RADAR in question, the
threat display system _didn't_ flag it as a SAM threat.

The ability to intercept and analyse all the not-quite-current enemy
systems, understand the operating configuration d'jour and get the new
threat info into the hands of the troops has fallen well below our
current capability.

The West has no corner on cleverness. The Iraqis discovered that we no
longer had the capability for more than emitter bearing measurements in
current 'Weasel aircraft, unlike the bearing and elevation measurements
that the F-4Gs used to make. As a result, the Iraqis put their antennae
on towers and the HARMs were fuzed to detonate at ground level. Result
is very little damage to the antenna. Cleverness and motivation are
_always_ going to be present. You have to have the ability to evaluate
and respond in less time than you enemy can change his systems.

Funding for things like operations of the Rivet Joint./EP-3/ES-3 for -INT
gathering and maintaining the organizational competence to incorporate that
intel is at least as important as developing another slick variant on CDMA.
Technique is closely linked to technology and the technology base that defines
what's possible in avionics is _commercial_ technology, not military.

All of the key data and signal processor architectures are supported by
commercial applications, not military contracts. As such, the key elements of
signal and data processing chain implementation lie in the public domain. The
algorithms require competent mathematicians which are available to many nations.
That means that the resources needed to change sensor waveforms and processing
in novel ways is and will be more widespread. The old regime for -INT operations
focused on one or two sources for hostile systems. Now, most nations with a
reasonable number of university graduates can build modified systems. That means
lots of suprises in store.

--
If it's OK that Bill smoked but didn't inhale,
it must be OK if Monica didn't swallow

From: Paul F Austin <paustin@digital.net>
Newsgroups: rec.aviation.military
Subject: Re: How to kill an S-300VM or S-300PMU battery ...
Date: Wed, 22 Jul 1998 00:46:14 GMT

Carlo Kopp wrote:

> Paul F Austin wrote:
> >
> > Carlo Kopp wrote:
> >
> > > Brian Varine wrote:
> > > >
> > > > Carlo Kopp wrote:
> > > >
> > > > > You are entitled to your opinion, Brian, but I will disagree. Firstly
> > > > > what look is a SAM system if you park it at the bottom of a valley ?
> > > > > Secondly, are you genuinely thinking about shooting clouds of chaff into
> > > > > the air everytime you get painted by an ISAR/GMTI ? Considered that this
> > > > > might just flag your position out there ? ...
> > >
> > > How many countries out there have the kind of EW know-how the West has ?
> > > Let alone the operational skills to use it right ?
> > >
> > > ...
> > > > Disagree all you want. You can't ignore ECM. How often does J-STARS, and
> > > > all that other stuff train in full scale ECM??? Rarely if ever.
> > >
> > > Not being privy to J-STARS ECCM design design features, Brian, I can't
> > > comment on whether an EW environment would make a big difference or not.
> > > But unless you are privy to specific EW design weaknesses in the E-8
> > > radar, then I would say this is a pointless throwaway argument.
> > >
> >
> > The 6 July AvWeek had a key lesson in EW highlighted: that _technique_
> > is insufficient. Thorough intel and rapid discimination and
> > incorporation of that intel are every bit as important as having the
> > very best ECM/ECCM.
> >
> > The case that stirred the pot is the Iraqi integration of French and Chinese
> > surveilance RADARs into their SA-2 net. The then-current threat list in
> > US RWRs didn't include the French and Chinese RADARs _as part of an SA-2
> > complex_ and
> > so when Allied aircraft were painted by the RADAR in question, the
> > threat display system _didn't_ flag it as a SAM threat.
> >
> > The ability to intercept and analyse all the not-quite-current enemy
> > systems, understand the operating configuration d'jour and get the new
> > threat info into the hands of the troops has fallen well below our
> > current capability.
> >
> > The West has no corner on cleverness. The Iraqis discovered that we no
> > longer had the capability for more than emitter bearing measurements in
> > current 'Weasel aircraft, unlike the bearing and elevation measurements
> > that the F-4Gs used to make. As a result, the Iraqis put their antennae
> > on towers and the HARMs were fuzed to detonate at ground level. Result
> > is very little damage to the antenna. Cleverness and motivation are
> > _always_ going to be present. You have to have the ability to evaluate
> > and respond in less time than you enemy can change his systems.
> >
> > Funding for things like operations of the Rivet Joint./EP-3/ES-3 for -INT
> > gathering and maintaining the organizational competence to incorporate that
> > intel is at least as important as developing another slick variant on CDMA.
> > Technique is closely linked to technology and the technology base that defines
> > what's possible in avionics is _commercial_ technology, not military.
> >
> > All of the key data and signal processor architectures are supported by
> > commercial applications, not military contracts. As such, the key elements of
> > signal and data processing chain implementation lie in the public domain. The
> > algorithms require competent mathematicians which are available to many nations.
> > That means that the resources needed to change sensor waveforms and processing
> > in novel ways is and will be more widespread. The old regime for -INT operations
> > focused on one or two sources for hostile systems. Now, most nations with a
> > reasonable number of university graduates can build modified systems. That means
> > lots of suprises in store.
> >
> Paul,
>
> I read that AvLeak piece as well. There is also some good stuff in a
> recent issue of JED on Sigint.
>
> This is BTW an overwhelming argument to cut over to stealth at the
> earliest possible date.
>
> The long term problem is going to be precisely this issue of an ever
> increasing number of possible modulations and signal formats/structures
> in a "rainbow threat environment".
>
> I was a little perplexed with the tone of the AvLeak item in that this
> situation was being reported as if it was a sudden and unanticipated
> change in the game plan. This is simply wrong, the issue has been under
> discussion in the EW community for some years now.
>
> The basic fact of life is that any country which reaches a given
> threshold level of technological capability can start building its own
> comms gear, radars, C3 networks, seekers etc. The imperative to
> porkbarrel is as important here as is the need for having capabilities
> which are not well known by other players.
>
> The relative stability of the threat capability base during the CW was a
> direct result of the Sov's weakness in digital processing and software.
> For anybody to assume that this would persist indefinitely is to be
> simply foolish.
>
> With digital technology proliferating now, the only safe assumptions you
> can make are:
>
> * every serious player out there will mix and match systems
>
> * every serious player will anticipate a multiple round ECM/ECCM cycle
> and have multiple measures up their sleeves for short cycle deployment
>
> * the only way to stay safely ahead is to go LO across the board, since
> any other approach (ie do what we have always done) will result in an
> exponentiating expense in the
> gathering-countermeasures-counter-countermeasures development cycle -
> there are simply too many permutations and surprises possible.
>
> Anyhow, some thoughts on the matter. I agree with your arguments here,
> in one sense, but I also think that not every player will be able to
> exploit this situation, ie not all players are serious players. Until
> the West goes wholly LO, the difficult issue will be in finding the
> balance between throwing good money after bad (ie keeping the "old"
> scheme rolling along to maintain pre-LO airframes viable), and
> investment in new technology.
>
> Expect the Russians to have a basic LPI capability by about 2005 if not
> earlier - they have all the required building blocks by now :-(
>
>

 LO airframes are going to get cheaper and they certainly make EW
simpler. A major part of LO airframe cost pays for the changeover to
composite structures fabrication. When the fab techniques for making
complex shapes in composite materials are perfected, an LO airframe
won't cost significantly more than an HO airframe.

Once the algorithms for shaping airframes are well understood, the
computational cost for a design is going to be very small.

LPI sensors and comms may be attacked using a BFMI approach since they
all depend on pseudo-random code sequences. One possible method of
attack would use a massive array of PRNG/correllator chips testing the
received IF for threshold-exceeding decoded data streams. Since the
PRNG/Correllator function is a _very_ small gate count (it's a small
part of a medium size die in Harris's CDMA transciever chip), you can
build a huge search engine cheaply.



--
He didn't inhale and she didn't swallow.
Bill said it, I believe it, that settles it.

From: thunder@rmii.com (Ed Rasimus)
Newsgroups: rec.aviation.military
Subject: Re: Canberra vs F-4 performance, F-4 vs F-111 $$$
Date: Sat, 27 Feb 1999 22:15:13 GMT

g_alcala@hotmail.com wrote:

>P.S.  Ed, according to the article by Walter Boyne in Air Force Magazine
>(http://www.afa.org/magazine/1197lineback.html), the Buffs themselves flew 21
>sorties against 8 SAM sites during LB II (probably 3 a/c aborted or were shot
>down first, as three attacks were only 2 a/c instead of three).

You can frag anyone against anything, but that doesn't mean it's going
to be effective. The way that was probably done was to target
coordinates that recce had recorded as active within the previous
24/48 hours.

Typically, however, the sites were seldom there two days in a row
during LB II. Our standard sequence for a Hunter/Killer mission during
the period was: phase one--Weasel monitors, warns and pre-empts with
ARMs. Phase two if missiles fired, second element attacks visually
with CBU. Phase three with Weasel winchester or prior to egress, the
second element takes the flight lead and visually recces using current
target photos or coordinates of previously active site. Phase four,
second element expends remaining ordinance on any airfield during
egress.

Phase 3 was seldom productive.
 Ed Rasimus                   *** Peak Computing Magazine
  Fighter Pilot (ret)         ***   (http://peak-computing.com)
                              *** Ziff-Davis Interactive
                              ***   (http://www.zdnet.com)