Newsgroups: sci.space.policy
From: henry@spsystems.net (Henry Spencer)
Subject: Re: Military Transport Cost Tradeoffs,  747 vs C17
Date: Thu, 21 Sep 2000 01:39:21 GMT

In article <39C93224.117B729F@harborside.com>,
Michael R. Irwin <mirwin@harborside.com> wrote:
>> >747s are for point to point transport between commercial
>> >grade runways.
>> Correct... which is how the C-5s are *actually used*, including in
>> wartime, and is almost certainly how the C-17s would be *actually used*...
>
>...War, however, is not engineering.   If the generals at the
>Pentagon and in the field feel these aircraft provide potentially
>valuable options in wartime mission planning and peacetime
>contingency planning then ...

The problem is that the generals have a habit of asking for more than they
really need -- after all, paranoia is part of their job -- and there needs
to be some amount of restraint and realism supplied from somewhere.

It is an observed fact, a matter of public record, that the C-5 has never
been used for front-line flying, even though the generals demanded that it
be capable of such.  This is not for lack of chances; its early career
included the Vietnam War, not to mention various lesser opportunities
since.  This justifies serious doubts about the requirement for a large
fleet of heavy transports capable of such operations.

Both logic and extensive past experience indicates that the heavies will
fly out of safe bases, with long hard runways, while the dangerous flying
up front is done (if at all) by smaller and more expendable transports
like the Hercules.  If the heavies were bought in really large numbers as
one-for-one Hercules replacements, *that* would be different, but there is
just no prospect of that.

>If that takes or even wastes money, so be it, we
>(the U.S.) have it to spend.

Not correct.  Such wasted money would be better spent on things which
genuinely make the troops safer and more effective, not on expensive toys
for the generals.

>...If mistakes
>are made then let them be in favor of excess capability vs.
>troops exposed to unnecessary risks in combat because
>we underpurchased useful systems for fear of them
>rotting on the shelf or increasing peacetime operating costs.

The issue is not whether it is worth spending the money, but what it is
*best* spent on.  For example, if we are concerned about exposing troops
to unnecessary risks, then equipping heavy transports for mass paratroop
drops is not merely unproductive, but actively harmful -- conducting such
an operation in real combat would border on lunacy, and the troops will be
safer, and no less effective, if the heavy transports can't do it.  A
small fraction of that money spent on, for example, better night-vision
equipment for crews of medium transports, will do far more for the safety
and effectiveness of the combat troops.

>Regarding your proposed acquisition strategy:   I
>think it assumes we have sufficient specialized military
>combat airlift capacity in current fleets.

Not quite.  What it assumes is that most of the specialized military
capabilities of the current *heavy* transports are never used, and are
thus a waste of money.  The one essential characteristic of the military
heavies is the ability to carry concentrated loads, something that
off-the-shelf commercial transports typically cannot do... but could be
modified for, at some cost in mass.

The money saved by *not* equipping the heavy transports with useless
combat-flying capabilities can then be spent on more of the medium
transports -- Hercules and the like -- which actually *do* the combat
flying.  The net result will be more heavy freight capability *and* more
combat freight capability, for the same amount of money... just not in the
same aircraft.

>...It is worth noting that U.S. registered
>commercial carrier aircraft can be mobilized quickly in time of
>large scale war...

As I understand it, the Civil Reserve Air Fleet program has largely fallen
apart since the Gulf War experience, which demonstrated to the airlines
that participation in it was a good way to lose a lot of money.  The
military will find it much harder to mobilize substantial numbers of large
commercial transports next time.  Oh, in a war threatening US national
survival there wouldn't be a serious problem, but that's not the sort of
war the US is likely to fight.  (The US military has had a consistent
problem of being so preoccupied with fighting Armageddon that they neglect
crucial capabilities for smaller wars.  CRAF was fine for Armageddon.)

>I will note that a primary strength of the U.S.
>military has always been superior logistics...

Quite true.  The issue is not that superior logistics isn't important,
but that some very expensive capabilities contribute almost nothing to
actually *achieving* superior logistics in a real war.
--
Microsoft shouldn't be broken up.       |  Henry Spencer   henry@spsystems.net
It should be shut down.  -- Phil Agre   |      (aka henry@zoo.toronto.edu)

Newsgroups: sci.space.policy
From: henry@spsystems.net (Henry Spencer)
Subject: Re: Military Transport Cost Tradeoffs,  747 vs C17
Date: Sat, 23 Sep 2000 20:52:33 GMT

In article <39CAC632.EC4B41F1@harborside.com>,
Michael R. Irwin <mirwin@harborside.com> wrote:
>> Both logic and extensive past experience indicates that the heavies will
>> fly out of safe bases, with long hard runways, while the dangerous flying
>> up front is done (if at all) by smaller and more expendable transports
>> like the Hercules...
>
>...Historically U.S. ground troops have
>been cut off behind enemy lines where logistical air
>drops would have have been or were useful.

Agreed, but that will not be done by the heavy transports.  The crucial
argument against it, always, is simply that the heavies have unique
long-haul capabilities and are available in only small numbers, so they
*must not* be risked when smaller aircraft can do the job.  Logistical air
drops in dangerous airspace -- and the airspace in the vicinity of cut-off
US units can hardly be anything but dangerous -- will be done by expendable
medium transports, not by scarce and irreplaceable heavy transports.

>Just because a weapons system has not been used in
>combat does not mean it is useless or not cost effective.

Correct, but it does suggest that equipping that system *for combat use*
at great expense is questionable.  If it hasn't been used in combat in
past wars, it probably won't be used in combat in future wars either.
Some allowance for different kinds of wars is admittedly necessary, but
there are limits.

>This criteria would invalidate the entire nuclear arsenal
>we (the U.S.) maintain as well as many other systems.

It certainly does suggest that the US nuclear arsenal could probably be
scaled back.  Oddly enough, that is just what's been happening in the last
decade or two.

>> ...equipping heavy transports for mass paratroop
>> drops is not merely unproductive, but actively harmful -- conducting such
>> an operation in real combat would border on lunacy...
>
>There is always a risk in combat of ground troops being
>cut off.   With the ability to control airspace the ability
>to airdrop supplies, heavy equipment and even additional
>troops; should it be determined to be militarily effective;
>should not be lightly tossed aside...

I would say that it should be carefully and thoughtfully tossed aside,
given that inserting troops by helicopter or by rough-field-capable medium
transports is *vastly* quicker and more effective than parachute drops
(the troops reach the ground together, formed up in their units and fully
equipped).  Furthermore, it is less dangerous to the aircraft, which can
fly at treetop height instead of at parachute altitude.

There's a reason why you don't see paratroop drops in real wars nowadays.

>if our generals think it might provide useful contingencies.

There's no limit to the number of things which *might* provide useful
capabilities in sufficiently outlandish situations.  In practice, though,
it's necessary to spend money mostly on things which will probably be
useful in a wide range of situations.  Since there is seldom even an
adequate supply of such general-purpose capabilities, spending a lot of
money on more specialized things is a stupid waste, unless there are
plausible situations in which they are *utterly vital*.  "Perhaps useful"
is not good enough.

>If a heavy is what is left or available in the theater
>when a critical airdrop is required I suspect it will be ordered in.

Quite, but the situation seems extremely contrived:  there are *no*
medium transports available in the theater?!?

>> ...The issue is not that superior logistics isn't important,
>> but that some very expensive capabilities contribute almost nothing to
>> actually *achieving* superior logistics in a real war.
>
>Well again I am going to have to ride with the Pentagon
>in determining what potential "real wars" they should be
>preparing for and how they should go about doing that.

In a democracy, it is the right *and duty* of citizens to question their
leaders' decisions, demand explanations, and insist that the decisions be
changed if the explanations are inadequate.  The Pentagon in particular
(and the USAF most especially) has a habit of becoming intoxicated by
high-end high-tech solutions, and neglecting the simpler and cheaper
things which often make a far bigger difference in real wars.
--
Microsoft shouldn't be broken up.       |  Henry Spencer   henry@spsystems.net
It should be shut down.  -- Phil Agre   |      (aka henry@zoo.toronto.edu)

From: gherbert@gw.retro.com (George William Herbert)
Newsgroups: sci.space.policy
Subject: Re: Military Transport Cost Tradeoffs,  747 vs C17
Date: 23 Sep 2000 19:24:12 -0700

Henry Spencer <henry@spsystems.net> wrote:
>Michael R. Irwin <mirwin@harborside.com> wrote:
>>> ...equipping heavy transports for mass paratroop
>>> drops is not merely unproductive, but actively harmful -- conducting such
>>> an operation in real combat would border on lunacy...
>>
>>There is always a risk in combat of ground troops being
>>cut off.   With the ability to control airspace the ability
>>to airdrop supplies, heavy equipment and even additional
>>troops; should it be determined to be militarily effective;
>>should not be lightly tossed aside...
>
>I would say that it should be carefully and thoughtfully tossed aside,
>given that inserting troops by helicopter or by rough-field-capable medium
>transports is *vastly* quicker and more effective than parachute drops
>(the troops reach the ground together, formed up in their units and fully
>equipped).  Furthermore, it is less dangerous to the aircraft, which can
>fly at treetop height instead of at parachute altitude.
>There's a reason why you don't see paratroop drops in real wars nowadays.

There is the implicit assumption there that there's a helicopter base
within range, rough field available, or time available to set up such
an intermediate range operation.

While likelyhood is low, there is a nonzero possibility of needing to
drop a large unit with little warning or prepositioning, straight
from the continental US (for example, the almost-invasion of Haiti
not that many years ago, a large contengent of the 101st Airborne
were suited up for a combat drop and in flight when the situation
was resolved peacefully...).  If you consider special ops requirements
(possibly having to deploy a unit from the Continental US with little
or no warning to random location around world without any ground
facilities available) the usability increases even more.

>>if our generals think it might provide useful contingencies.
>
>There's no limit to the number of things which *might* provide useful
>capabilities in sufficiently outlandish situations.  In practice, though,
>it's necessary to spend money mostly on things which will probably be
>useful in a wide range of situations.  Since there is seldom even an
>adequate supply of such general-purpose capabilities, spending a lot of
>money on more specialized things is a stupid waste, unless there are
>plausible situations in which they are *utterly vital*.  "Perhaps useful"
>is not good enough.

There are several steps to getting to why modern airlifters are so
customized, it's not fair to blame it all on the less likely paradrop
requirements.  For example, the rear cargo doors aren't just used for
dropping things from the air, they're how you get large oversize
cargo on board, and how you do field load/unload of the aircraft
without any ground support equipment.  That in particular is a good
reason to have a fair number of so-designed cargo aircraft; the 747-400F
cannot self-unload under any circumstances.  Look at how many C-17,
C-141, and C-5 flights over the last 30 years have gone into places
with no ground gear to unload them... I can easily see a legitimate
ruling out of using 747s on that basis alone.  So you end up with a
custom airframe, with a large ramp, etc. by legitimate and well
demonstrated military operational needs.

Once you have that ramp, how much more do you need to be able to
paradrop large items or quantities of people if you want to do
that too... not much.  The marginal cost of adding that to your
demonstrably required to be highly custom airframe isn't very
much, and it has been used before and might be needed again,
so why not.

Once you have that aircraft, why not get a limited number of
them for such operations and use 747-400Fs for most cargo?
That depends in detail on the porportion of missions which
will need the additional capabilities, the relative costs
of the airframes and the structural cost of the Air Force
supporting yet another airframe type in quantity; there are
currently a few command and control and VIP 747s in military
service, but that's different than deploying their required
maintenance capability everywhere.  On the plus side, there
are a lot of airports around the world which are 747 maintenance
qualified already...

The details of that tradeoff can come down either way, you would
have to see the detailed reports to know why they chose what
they did.

>>If a heavy is what is left or available in the theater
>>when a critical airdrop is required I suspect it will be ordered in.
>
>Quite, but the situation seems extremely contrived:  there are *no*
>medium transports available in the theater?!?

No medium transports that can range a particular drop zone in time,
sure... especially if you're talking about longer distance operations.

>>> ...The issue is not that superior logistics isn't important,
>>> but that some very expensive capabilities contribute almost nothing to
>>> actually *achieving* superior logistics in a real war.
>>
>>Well again I am going to have to ride with the Pentagon
>>in determining what potential "real wars" they should be
>>preparing for and how they should go about doing that.
>
>In a democracy, it is the right *and duty* of citizens to question their
>leaders' decisions, demand explanations, and insist that the decisions be
>changed if the explanations are inadequate.  The Pentagon in particular
>(and the USAF most especially) has a habit of becoming intoxicated by
>high-end high-tech solutions, and neglecting the simpler and cheaper
>things which often make a far bigger difference in real wars.

True.  But it's not a slam dunk that the COTS solution is right either...


-george william herbert
gherbert@retro.com

Newsgroups: sci.space.policy
From: henry@spsystems.net (Henry Spencer)
Subject: Re: Military Transport Cost Tradeoffs,  747 vs C17
Date: Sun, 24 Sep 2000 19:34:53 GMT

In article <8qjokc$c8r$1@gw.retro.com>,
George William Herbert <gherbert@gw.retro.com> wrote:
>While likelyhood is low, there is a nonzero possibility of needing to
>drop a large unit with little warning or prepositioning, straight
>from the continental US...

I'm still a trifle skeptical, especially of the "straight from the
continental US" part (which is commonly cited as a reason for all kinds of
long-range combat systems); it strikes me as verging on contrived.

>...If you consider special ops requirements
>(possibly having to deploy a unit from the Continental US with little
>or no warning to random location around world without any ground
>facilities available) the usability increases even more.

Special ops could justify a handful of such aircraft, but not a whole
fleet of them... and since that's grossly uneconomical, a much more
practical way to address the special-ops requirement is flight refueling
of medium transports.  Which is already done.  There is also the question,
again, of whether an inherently-hazardous special-ops mission is going to
be *allowed* to use a scarce asset like a heavy transport.

>There are several steps to getting to why modern airlifters are so
>customized, it's not fair to blame it all on the less likely paradrop
>requirements...

I wasn't, actually, although I emphasized paradrop (perhaps too much) as
an example.

>For example, the rear cargo doors aren't just used for
>dropping things from the air, they're how you get large oversize
>cargo on board, and how you do field load/unload of the aircraft
>without any ground support equipment.

You can put large oversize cargo (although not quite *as* large) on a 747,
actually, through the nose... but you do need substantial ground
facilities.  Which gets us back to the bottom line, that *in practice* the
heavies invariably operate from major airbases, with hard runways and at
least the potential for having capable support equipment.

>...Look at how many C-17,
>C-141, and C-5 flights over the last 30 years have gone into places
>with no ground gear to unload them...

I'm not immediately aware of any C-5 flights that have done that, I call
the C-141 a medium transport, and the C-17 has been under great pressure
to justify its high cost by "proving" that its capabilities are useful.
And in any event, the key question is how many such flights *had* to go
into places which *necessarily* lacked ground-unloading gear, not how many
times it was done as an unimportant convenience.

>Once you have that aircraft, why not get a limited number of
>them for such operations and use 747-400Fs for most cargo?

This is in fact exactly my point of view... except that it seems to me
that the USAF *already has* that small fleet of specialized aircraft, in
the form of the C-5.  So attention should focus on the 747s, not on a new
combat heavy transport.
--
Microsoft shouldn't be broken up.       |  Henry Spencer   henry@spsystems.net
It should be shut down.  -- Phil Agre   |      (aka henry@zoo.toronto.edu)

Newsgroups: sci.space.policy
From: henry@spsystems.net (Henry Spencer)
Subject: Re: Military Transport Cost Tradeoffs,  747 vs C17
Date: Sun, 24 Sep 2000 23:26:55 GMT

In article <39ce765a.96802696@news.seanet.com>,
Derek Lyons <elde@hurricane.net> wrote:
>>I'm still a trifle skeptical, especially of the "straight from the
>>continental US" part (which is commonly cited as a reason for all kinds of
>>long-range combat systems); it strikes me as verging on contrived.
>
>...It's a basic military axiom, supported by long and bitter experience
>dating back to about 1000BC, that the further and faster you can
>reach, the better off you are.

Oh, I don't doubt that being able to operate from the CONUS is *useful*.
What I question is whether that capability in general, and that capability
in a new combat heavy transport in particular, is worth a lot of money,
given likely wars and limited budgets.

Small requirements for such long-range combat cargo flying, like special
ops, can be met already with C-5s or C-130s plus tankers.  The question is
whether it's worth spending a bundle to greatly expand US capabilities in
that area.  Especially since large-scale operations of that sort demand
solid local air superiority plus effective air-defence suppression, and
achieving *that* from the CONUS is going to be quite a trick.
--
Microsoft shouldn't be broken up.       |  Henry Spencer   henry@spsystems.net
It should be shut down.  -- Phil Agre   |      (aka henry@zoo.toronto.edu)