From: Mary Shafer <shafer@rigel.dfrc.nasa.gov>
Newsgroups: sci.space.shuttle
Subject: Re: Post Mission Shuttle Transport
Date: 14 Jan 2000 14:02:11 -0800

jamesstep@aol.comNO-SPAM (JamesStep) writes:

> >It would be difficult, to say the least,
> >to move the Shuttle by truck from California
> >to Florida.
>
> Yes; I think it would be almost impossible!

But not completely impossible.  The early Orbiters were brought
overland, on surface streets, from Plant 42, in Palmdale, to Edwards.
The route was turn right out of the plant onto Ave M, go up to 10th
St. East (now named Challenger Way) and turn left, take 10th east all
the way through Lancaster to Avenue E, where the paving stops, ease it
onto the gravel road across the west end of the base, turn right on
Roasmond Blvd, come all the way into base, turn right on Lancaster
Blvd (120th St. E off-base, I think), turn left onto the runway
overrun, go down to the runway and turn onto the taxiway, and then
stay on it down to the MDD.

Only 35 miles or so and it only took about half a day.  The X-15s were
quicker, but they were also a lot smaller.

> Not only do you have the problem of the width of
> the shuttle (talk about a wide load!), but you also have
> the problem of its height (it couldn't fit under any
> underpasses).

So you go on a route with no underpasses.  It's rare that a load like
this would go on the freeways.  Instead, such loads go on the first or
second class of road down from a freeway.

> There would also be a tremendous security problem, as
> they'd have to close the highways and provide a large
> security escort for the entire journey.

We only had about 20 cars in the cavalcade.  One CHP car on point and
one on drag, with the local forces handling traffic control
(i.e. blocking the cross streets or doing a moving closure of the road
at the appropriate time)

Mentioning that the X-15s were brought overland long before the
Orbiters were had reminded me of a story, which my husband heard from
someone who was there.  The X-15 had landed at one of the dry lakes
under its trajectory, I think because the engine hadn't lit, and FRC
(that's what Dryden was before it became DFRC) was recovering it with
a tractor-trailer and an escort.  They'd loaded it up in the early
morning and were bringing it back slowly, with the California (or
Nevada, I don't know which lake it was) Highway Patrol providing
leading and trailing escorts, some a ways out in front or behind, with
flashing lights.  I believe it was dark, either because they were just
starting out or hadn't quite gotten here.

A pick-up with a camper on it came dashing up from behind and passed
the slow CHP car back some distance, the close CHP car, the eight or
ten escort vehicle, and began to pass the trailer with the X-15 on it.
The X-15, being wider than the trailer, had its wings hanging over the
side, sticking out some distance.  Remember that it was dark and the
X-15 is matte or semi-matte black, making it pretty much invisible,
even though they'd stuck a light on each wingtip for this trip.  Well,
you've probably figured it out--about a third of the way past the
trailer, the front corner of camper shell met the trailing edge of the
X-15 wing, which sliced through it like a hot knife though butter.

By this time, everyone had stopped and the CHP officers were out of
their cars and asking the driver for registration and license.  While
that was going on, the mechanics managed to separate the X-15 and the
camper and inspect the X-15 and its tie-downs.  So far as they could
see, there was no major damage, although the surface of the wing was
slightly marred in one place, probably where it went through the
corner of the camper.  They got the driver's information, started back
up, and went down the road with no further problem.  The fellow who
told Ken about this said that most of them spent the rest of the trip
wondering just how that driver was going to explain the whole thing to
friends, family, and, most importantly, insurance agent.

--
Mary Shafer    http://www.dfrc.nasa.gov/People/Shafer/mary.html
shafer@rigel.dfrc.nasa.gov     Of course I don't speak for NASA
Lead Handling Qualities Engineer, SR-71/LASRE
NASA Dryden Flight Research Center, Edwards, CA
For non-aerospace mail, use shafer@ursa-major.spdcc.com please

From: Mary Shafer <shafer@rigel.dfrc.nasa.gov>
Newsgroups: sci.space.shuttle
Subject: Re: Post Mission Shuttle Transport
Date: 19 Jan 2000 12:21:25 -0800

henry@spsystems.net (Henry Spencer) writes:

> In article <u0ogao2ty4.fsf@rigel.dfrc.nasa.gov>,
> Mary Shafer  <shafer@rigel.dfrc.nasa.gov> wrote:

> >...the front corner of camper shell met the trailing edge of the
> >X-15 wing, which sliced through it like a hot knife though butter.
> >...the mechanics managed to separate the X-15 and the
> >camper and inspect the X-15 and its tie-downs.  So far as they could
> >see, there was no major damage, although the surface of the wing was
> >slightly marred in one place...

> For those who find this a bit surprising, note that the X-15 was built to
> go Mach 8 at a time when very little was known about hypersonic flight,
> so the wing was built *strong*.

The X-15 was made of high-nickel steel, Inconel-X, and heat-annealed
frequently.  It was beyond strong.  A friend found a piece of Mike
Adam's X-15 out in the desert and tried to cut it apart.  Not only
couldn't he cut it with anything he tried, he couldn't even scratch it
with most of them.  I've forgotten the list, but it included carbide
and diamond files or drill bits.  I think he managed a few scratches
with a diamond drill bit, but that was about it.

Another, unstated bit of information is that campers, particularly
those that fit in the truck bed of a pick-up, are not built like
X-15s.  Rather, they're designed to be lightweight and inexpensive, as
well as easy to manufacture.  The usual construction at that time was
thin aluminum sheeting over a wood frame, with the "big" frame members
being something like 2x2".  People used to modern RVs and fifth-wheels
would be shocked at the lack of structural reinforcement.

--
Mary Shafer    http://www.dfrc.nasa.gov/People/Shafer/mary.html
shafer@rigel.dfrc.nasa.gov     Of course I don't speak for NASA
Lead Handling Qualities Engineer, SR-71/LASRE
NASA Dryden Flight Research Center, Edwards, CA
For non-aerospace mail, use shafer@ursa-major.spdcc.com please

Newsgroups: sci.space.shuttle
From: henry@spsystems.net (Henry Spencer)
Subject: Re: Post Mission Shuttle Transport
Date: Thu, 20 Jan 2000 00:50:16 GMT

In article <u0bt6hzube.fsf@rigel.dfrc.nasa.gov>,
Mary Shafer  <shafer@rigel.dfrc.nasa.gov> wrote:
>> For those who find this a bit surprising, note that the X-15 was built to
>> go Mach 8 at a time when very little was known about hypersonic flight,
>> so the wing was built *strong*.
>
>The X-15 was made of high-nickel steel, Inconel-X, and heat-annealed
>frequently...

Well, the wing internal structure, away from the high heat loads on the
surface, was mere titanium. :-)  Still pretty stubborn stuff, though,
and used in generous quantities as a hedge against unknown conditions.

>...The usual construction at that time was
>thin aluminum sheeting over a wood frame, with the "big" frame members
>being something like 2x2".  People used to modern RVs and fifth-wheels
>would be shocked at the lack of structural reinforcement.

Admittedly, keeping the rain out is a bit easier than keeping an X-15 wing
out...
--
The space program reminds me        |  Henry Spencer   henry@spsystems.net
of a government agency.  -Jim Baen  |      (aka henry@zoo.toronto.edu)

Newsgroups: sci.space.policy
From: henry@spsystems.net (Henry Spencer)
Subject: Re: Why not X-33?
Date: Wed, 9 Aug 2000 19:30:43 GMT

In article <8moib3$iaa$1@news.netvision.net.il>,
Bruce <bater@netvision.net.il> wrote:
>Come to think of it, didn't the DC-X have just one prototype? Although this
>contradicts my previous statement that might be a good example of the
>consequences of building just one prototype.

There was only one DC-X, and that was recognized from the start as a flaw
in the program.  (As indeed it was, terminating the program when that one
was lost.)

The X-15 program built three aircraft precisely so that it could run an
efficient test program at a reasonable flight rate despite occasional
major damage.  Past experience had indicated that such a program could
make good use of two aircraft; the third was explicitly a hedge against
the possibility that one X-15 might sometimes be in the shop for a while,
for modification or repairs.  (And indeed, on two or three occasions North
American had to put a badly damaged X-15 back together.)  With three of
them, the program could maintain something approaching a normal pace even
though they got broken now and then.
--
Microsoft shouldn't be broken up.       |  Henry Spencer   henry@spsystems.net
It should be shut down.  -- Phil Agre   |      (aka henry@zoo.toronto.edu)

From: James A Davis <jimdavis2@primary.net>
Newsgroups: sci.space.policy
Subject: Re: X-34 Slowdown
Date: Wed, 23 Aug 2000 19:16:53 -0500

Pat Bahn wrote:

> what follow-on could come from the X-15?

In the 1950s it was believed that the speed of high performance military
aircraft would continue to increase. It was expected that the 1960s
would see fighters with top speeds of Mach 4 and 5. The X-15 was
intended to provide data that could be used in the design of these
aircraft just as data from the X-1 was used in the design of supersonic
aircraft from the F-100 onwards. The X-15 was never intended to be the
precursor of any particular design any more than the X-1 was.

In the event, the 1950s saw top speeds reach a plateau that has lasted
for 40 years. The X-15 program, although brilliantly conducted and
spectacularly successful, was largely a waste of effort. But this could
not have been foreseen when the program was started.

Jim Davis

From: "Jim Davis" <jimdavis2@primary.net>
Newsgroups: sci.space.policy
Subject: Re: X-34 Slowdown
Date: Thu, 24 Aug 2000 07:49:49 -0500

Michael P. Walsh wrote...

> > In the event, the 1950s saw top speeds reach a plateau that has lasted
> > for 40 years. The X-15 program, although brilliantly conducted and
> > spectacularly successful, was largely a waste of effort. But this could
> > not have been foreseen when the program was started.

> You mean all the data went away and was never used for such things
> as the Space Shuttle?

The data never went anywhere. The X-15 data was only marginally relevant to
the shuttle program. The shuttle's speed range was well beyond that of the
X-15. Data from the various ICBM, IRBM, reentry vehicle, ASSET, and PRIME
tests were far more relevant to the shuttle than the data from the X-15.
Just compare the leading edge radii of the X-15 and shuttle aero surfaces.
Had the X-15 program never happened the impact on the shuttle program would
have been nil.

> One of the reasons advanced technology programs have trouble
> getting started is because there is usually a requirement that a
> follow-on application be in view.  Regarding the X-15 as
> "largely a waste of effort" is not good reasoning, in
> my opinion.

My characterization of the X-15 as "largely a waste of effort" is more of an
observation than a conclusion. The rapid development of the ballistic
missile in the 1950s pushed the X-15 program into the marginal relevance
category. But let me ask you: if there had been no X-15 program could the
shuttle have still been designed and built in the same time frame and at the
same cost as it actually was? Or would NASA have had to delay any shuttle
effort until an X-15-like program could have been carried out?

Jim Davis

Newsgroups: sci.space.policy
From: henry@spsystems.net (Henry Spencer)
Subject: Re: X-34 Slowdown
Date: Thu, 24 Aug 2000 02:19:30 GMT

In article <39A46975.E2542129@primary.net>,
James A Davis  <jimdavis2@primary.net> wrote:
>In the 1950s it was believed that the speed of high performance military
>aircraft would continue to increase. It was expected that the 1960s
>would see fighters with top speeds of Mach 4 and 5...

And in fact, it *almost* happened.  The turbojet/ramjet F-103, well
advanced in development when it was cancelled in 1957, was designed for
Mach 3.7 and would probably have gone higher.  There were other programs
headed the same way.

>In the event, the 1950s saw top speeds reach a plateau that has lasted
>for 40 years.

With minor specialized exceptions, like the Blackbird and Foxbat.  The
combination of increased technical difficulties (as turbojets and aluminum
structure had to be replaced by fancier technology beyond about Mach 2.5),
growing problems with cost, and a protracted squabble over aircraft vs.
missiles in the late 1950s acted to stop the progression short of Mach 3.
There was nothing inherent about this number, and things could easily have
gone significantly farther.
--
Microsoft shouldn't be broken up.       |  Henry Spencer   henry@spsystems.net
It should be shut down.  -- Phil Agre   |      (aka henry@zoo.toronto.edu)

Newsgroups: sci.space.tech
From: henry@spsystems.net (Henry Spencer)
Subject: Re: suborbital vehicle for X-Prize
Date: Tue, 13 Feb 2001 19:23:47 GMT

In article <96ates$11rr$1@news.hal-pc.org>, Jon Berndt <jsb@hal-pc.org> wrote:
>The target altitude specified by the X-Prize of 100 km was chosen to
>preclued the need for *exotic* heat shielding (what the heck does that
>actually mean?). Look at the X-15 as a design case study: The X-15A-2 had
>spray-on thermal ablator which proved to be barely sufficient, and in some
>cases insufficient. The X-15 structure was made of Inconel / Titanium...

The original X-15s reached circa 100km several times, without the ablator.
However, the Inconel skin was specifically designed as thermal protection,
of a kind ("heat sink") now considered an obsolete approach.
--
When failure is not an option, success  |  Henry Spencer   henry@spsystems.net
can get expensive.   -- Peter Stibrany  |      (aka henry@zoo.toronto.edu)