Newsgroups: alt.movies,sci.space.policy
From: henry@spsystems.net (Henry Spencer)
Subject: Re: Japanese, bombs, etc. (was Re: (Starship Troopers...)
Date: Sat, 19 Feb 2000 18:17:58 GMT

In article <38A8CF57.BA299012@gnelson.demon.co.uk>,
Graham Nelson  <graham@gnelson.demon.co.uk> wrote:
>...There was considerable controversy and some
>protest when a statue was eventually erected to commemorate
>the RAF head of bombing -- in American terms, this would be
>about the same as putting up a statue of Curtis LeMay.

One reason why there is some controversy about lionizing "Bomber" Harris
is that his strategy seems to have gotten a lot of bomber crews killed to
little purpose.  LeMay's campaign was both more effective and far less
costly, due to more vulnerable targets, greater resources, and the near
collapse of Japanese air defences.

Harris was obsessed with razing cities, to the point that he largely
ignored pleas for more focused attacks on more specific targets.  When
such attacks were arranged despite his opposition, they often proved
inordinately effective.  For example, the aerial mining of the Danube --
permitted partly because Harris considered it a low-risk mission, useful
for breaking in new bomber crews! -- required a fraction of the resources
spent on even one of Harris's monster raids, and was a devastating blow to
Germany's economy.  The closing of the Danube to barge traffic doubled or
tripled the demands on Germany's already-overloaded rail network, and
greatly reduced the flow of oil to Germany in particular.  This was done
at a total cost of eleven (11) bombers; it is not even mentioned in the
official history of the bombing campaign.  It could have been done at
least a year earlier, and extended to other areas of water transport as
well, had Harris been less obstinate.
--
The space program reminds me        |  Henry Spencer   henry@spsystems.net
of a government agency.  -Jim Baen  |      (aka henry@zoo.toronto.edu)

Newsgroups: rec.aviation.military,sci.physics,sci.space.policy,alt.war.nuclear
From: henry@spsystems.net (Henry Spencer)
Subject: Re: Rationality (was Re: NMD - how to detect mass?
Date: Thu, 27 Jul 2000 14:06:15 GMT

In article <n2Jf5.59374$DH3.1937437@news-east.usenetserver.com>,
Ian Stirling  <Inquisitor@I.am> wrote:
>>"Bomber" Harris and Curtis LeMay are not usually considered war criminals.
>>Nor are their German counterparts who planned the air war against Britain...
>
>A reasonable definition probably has to include what's possible.
>At that time precision bombing diddn't really exist, you just couldn't
>take a map, circle the targets, and have the bombs only fall on the target,
>massive saturation had to be used.
>So, to get "efficiant" use of weapons, you need spread out targets with
>distributed value: cities.

Even at the time, precision bombing was good *enough* that more selective
attacks were both feasible and desirable.  Harris in particular *wanted*
to raze cities, and was vehemently opposed to attempting more precise
attacks.

For example, Harris finally authorized using a handful of his bombers to
mine the Danube mostly because he thought it made a good low-risk training
mission for new bomber crews... and that "training mission", carried out
by tiny forces with negligible losses, probably shortened the war at least
a year.  (It essentially ended river freight traffic -- which included
most of Germany's oil -- and greatly increased the demands on Germany's
already-overstrained rail network.  The Germans also invested considerable
effort in sweeping the mines, and diverted a lot of air-defence resources
trying to prevent re-mining.)

The Dambuster raids are another example, with a significant impact on
overall German industrial production at relatively small cost.  There were
more opportunities for this sort of precision attack on high-value targets,
and they were never pursued because of high-level opposition.
--
Microsoft shouldn't be broken up.       |  Henry Spencer   henry@spsystems.net
It should be shut down.  -- Phil Agre   |      (aka henry@zoo.toronto.edu)

Newsgroups: sci.space.policy,sci.space.shuttle,sci.space.history
From: henry@spsystems.net (Henry Spencer)
Subject: Re: von Braun (was Re: It's that time of year again...)
Date: Wed, 20 Dec 2000 03:28:29 GMT

In article <3A3FE9B5.833C6612@gnelson.demon.co.uk>,
Graham Nelson  <graham@gnelson.demon.co.uk> wrote:
>Nevertheless there's no moral equivalency between von Braun, whose
>weapons were made in a concentration camp using slave labourers who
>died in their thousands, and RAF Bomber Command, who did kill a lot
>of their pilots, but at least trained them first and mostly used
>volunteers.

Derek has already addressed the slave-labor issue.  To which I would add
that Freeman Dyson has estimated that 10,000 or more Lancaster crewmen
died solely because Bomber Command did not *care* about their welfare, and
was not interested in finding out why the survival rate from downed
Lancasters was so much poorer than from other British bombers.  (Almost
certainly it was because the escape hatch was two inches narrower.  Mike
O'Loughlin, one of Dyson's colleagues in RAF operations research, spent
two years fighting totally unresponsive management to get the hatch
enlarged.  By the time he succeeded, the war was essentially over.)
--
When failure is not an option, success  |  Henry Spencer   henry@spsystems.net
can get expensive.   -- Peter Stibrany  |      (aka henry@zoo.toronto.edu)

Newsgroups: sci.space.policy,sci.space.shuttle,sci.space.history
From: henry@spsystems.net (Henry Spencer)
Subject: Re: von Braun (was Re: It's that time of year again...)
Date: Wed, 20 Dec 2000 15:16:29 GMT

In article <91qd6e$4u2n0$1@ID-22231.news.dfncis.de>,
Jim Davis <jimdavis2@primary.net> wrote:
>> died solely because Bomber Command did not *care* about their welfare, and
>> was not interested in finding out why the survival rate from downed
>> Lancasters was so much poorer than from other British bombers.  (Almost
>> certainly it was because the escape hatch was two inches narrower...
>
>Henry, do you have any other reference in addition to Dyson about this
>matter?

No, although I have not gone digging.  For some reason, this sort of thing
tends not to get into the official histories.  Open discussion of such
matters was rigorously forbidden, for fear that the crews might learn how
poor their chances were.

Bomber Command's general callousness towards its crews, and its tendency
to blame problems on them or on factors beyond anyone's control, rather
than on deficiencies in procedures and equipment, is well documented.

>To which hatch does Dyson refer?

I believe there's only one belly escape hatch, although it's been a long
time since I've seen details on the Lancaster.
--
When failure is not an option, success  |  Henry Spencer   henry@spsystems.net
can get expensive.   -- Peter Stibrany  |      (aka henry@zoo.toronto.edu)

Newsgroups: sci.space.policy,sci.space.shuttle,sci.space.history
From: henry@spsystems.net (Henry Spencer)
Subject: Re: von Braun (was Re: It's that time of year again...)
Date: Wed, 20 Dec 2000 18:20:08 GMT

In article <91qp9h$17f$1@newsg4.svr.pol.co.uk>,
Steve Travis <steve@doctorsteve.fsnet.co.uk> wrote:
>> >Excuse my ignorance - who is Dyson?
>> Freeman Dyson.
>
>And what is he famous for?

He originally made his scientific reputation in quantum mechanics.  More
recently he's written and spoken prominently on various science and
science-policy topics.  His association with this particular discussion is
because he worked for RAF operations analysis during WW2 -- essentially,
documenting the flaws and failures of the bomber campaign, and discovering
that higher command did not want to hear about them -- and has since
written about it.

(As an example, he was the one who discovered that experienced bomber
crews no longer had any survival advantage over fresh ones -- they'd done
better early in the war, but later this advantage disappeared.  Something
had changed; the Germans had developed an attack method which gave even
experienced crews no chance to defend themselves.  The analysts' guess --
later proved correct -- was that the Germans were fitting their fighters
with upward-firing guns rather than the usual forward-firing guns, and
attacking the bombers from their blind spot, underneath.  The analysts
suggested deleting the useless defensive guns altogether, making the
bombers lighter and substantially faster, and incidentally reducing the
number of skilled crewmen needed.  At the very least, it could be tried as
an experiment.  Bomber Command vetoed the idea completely.)
--
When failure is not an option, success  |  Henry Spencer   henry@spsystems.net
can get expensive.   -- Peter Stibrany  |      (aka henry@zoo.toronto.edu)